Low Cost and Compact Quantum Cryptography by Duligall, J. L. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
08
21
3v
2 
 3
 O
ct
 2
00
6
Low Cost and Compact Quantum Key Distribution
J L Duligall1, M S Godfrey1, K A Harrison2, W J Munro2 and
J G Rarity1
1 Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Bristol,
University Walk, Bristol, BS8 1TR
2 Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Filton Road, Stoke Gifford, Bristol, BS34 8QZ
E-mail: joanna.duligall@bristol.ac.uk
Abstract. We present the design of a novel free-space quantum cryptography system,
complete with purpose-built software, that can operate in daylight conditions. The
transmitter and receiver modules are built using inexpensive off-the-shelf components.
Both modules are compact allowing the generation of renewed shared secrets on
demand over a short range of a few metres. An analysis of the software is shown as
well as results of error rates and therefore shared secret yields at varying background
light levels. As the system is designed to eventually work in short-range consumer
applications, we also present a use scenario where the consumer can regularly ‘top up’
a store of secrets for use in a variety of one-time-pad and authentication protocols.
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1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography provides a means for two parties to securely generate shared
secret material. In practice, this means that two parties can amplify an initial store of
shared secrets. This shared secret may be used in three primary ways: to protect the
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) algorithm itself in order to generate new shared
secrets, to identify themselves to each other, and to act as an encryption key to
classically encrypt messages being sent between themselves. It is usual to delete the
shared secret once it has been used. Consequently, the shared secret should be thought
of as being consumable. Secrecy of the shared secret generation is safeguarded by
encoding information on non-orthogonal quantum states which an eavesdropper cannot
measure without disturbing. Quantum key distribution protocols are designed in such
a way as to detect these disturbances and thus alert the two legitimate users to an
eavesdropper’s presence. Whilst QKD, in principle, is provably secure against an
attacker using technology, both realistic and theoretical, experimentalists in the field
are set the challenge of developing a system using current methods and apparatus whilst
maintaining this ideal.
In this work we present a low cost QKD system that is aimed at protecting consumer
transactions. We are willing to compromise a little on performance while retaining the
high security associated with quantum protocols. The design philosophy is based on
a future hand-held ‘electronic credit/debit card’ which communicates with consumer
outlets (an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), for example) using free space optics.
This device then also acts as a store of secrets shared only with the bank (or central
secure server) which can be used to protect online transactions. With quantum key
distribution protecting the interface between the ATM and the users handheld device,
there is no possibility of an eavesdropper gaining key information via ‘skimming’ attacks
whereby the key and card details are read using a so-called ‘false front’ on the ATM
itself.
Figure 1. The quantum cryptography kit.
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This paper briefly introduces the most commonly used quantum cryptography
protocol devised by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] since it has been implemented
in the system presented. We give an overview of current research and aims in the field
and then go on to outline our intended short range application. Section 2 describes
the proposed system in detail focusing on how costs were brought down without
compromising overly on performance. Section 3 details the experimental setup with
emphasis on the purpose-built software and then presents key exchange results under
various background light conditions and a security analysis of the system as a whole.
Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the improvements needed in order to
implement the proposed system within its intended application.
1.1. The BB84 Protocol
The BB84 protocol utilizes the quantum property that orthogonal polarization states
can be fully discriminated and thus can be used to encode information whilst non-
orthogonal polarization states cannot since measuring one necessarily randomizes the
other. The protocol encodes information in the rectilinear basis (horizontal and vertical
polarization) and the diagonal basis (45◦ and 135◦ polarization). The process begins
with the transmitter (Alice) sending a random sequence of photons polarized in each
of the four states (0◦ , 45◦ , 90◦ and 135◦ ). The receiver (Bob) performs polarization
measurements on the arriving photons, choosing to measure in the rectilinear or diagonal
basis randomly for each photon. Alice will not know in what basis Bob measured the
photons and similarly Bob is unaware of Alice’s encoding basis. Once the quantum
transmission is concluded, Bob announces publicly, over a classical communication
channel, which photons he received and in what basis he measured them but not the
actual results. Alice then replies with the instances where Bob chose the correct basis
and they both discard all others. Alice will also discard all photons that Bob’s detectors
did not receive. If Alice and Bob use a coding scheme of 0◦ and 45◦ representing bit
value 0, and 90◦ and 135◦ representing bit value 1, then the random bit string generated
is the raw key. Alice and Bob’s results should theoretically now be correlated unless
eavesdropping has taken place on the quantum channel. The eavesdropper is required to
measure photons in a random basis uncorrelated to that of Alice and then will reinject
photons with errors. Eavesdropping is thus actively monitored by regularly measuring
the error rate and discarding data where the error rate exceeds a certain threshold
(typically ∼ 11%) [2].
In an experimental setup, errors will exist in the raw key because of a number
of causes, including optical imperfections, background counts and detector noise. A
process of error correction is therefore required and a variety of techniques are now being
employed [3–6]. To minimise any information that Eve might have gained during the
quantum transmission and, indeed, in the error correcting process, a further technique
known as privacy amplification [7] is performed resulting in a secret key shared only by
Alice and Bob. It is also usual to have both message integrity and sender authentication
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on all communications over the classical channel in order to defeat a man-in-the-middle
attack by Eve.
1.2. Current trends in quantum cryptography
Research in this area is focussed on several key factors. The most obvious areas
for improvement are transmission range and rate. Long distance free-space QKD
experiments have developed to the extent where a 23km key exchange at night was
carried out by Kurtsiefer et al [8] in 2002. Significant progress has been made in daylight
QKD operation, initially by Jacobs and Franson in 1996 [9] and later by Buttler et al [10]
in 1998. The current record is a 10km link achieved by Hughes et al in 2002 [11]. A
study has also taken place suggesting that there are no technical obstacles in developing
a quantum key distribution system between ground and low earth orbit satellites [12].
Systems using optical fibre as the transmission medium have achieved greater distances
with Gobby et al [13] achieving key exchange over 122km. As far as transmission rate
is concerned, several systems are now operating at giga-hertz clock rates [14, 15].
Improving current technologies is imperative for quantum cryptography’s future.
Producing detectors with greater efficiency as well as moving away from faint pulsed
lasers as approximations to single photons will eradicate many security worries.
Improvements in the reliability and efficiency of true single photon sources are being
made with encouraging results [16]. QKD systems are now being sold as commercial
products. MagiQ Technologies ‡, IDQuantique§ and SmartQuantum‖ all offer fibre-
based systems for sale whilst other organisations such as QinetiQ, Toshiba and NIST
have quantum cryptography capabilities. The systems currently available are expensive,
use purpose-built components and are made-to-order. Moreover, their market base
is primarily organisations such as the military, financial services or high intellectual
property establishments. The work presented in this paper is a clear departure from
this goal. It represents a ground-up approach to quantum cryptography, exploring
the possibilities of bringing secure electronic communication and data exchange to the
consumer. This research forms part of the SECOQC network¶ and concentrates on
that final link in the chain from network to consumer/end user by providing end-to-end
security for the user as well as the channel.
1.3. The Application
Figures of credit card fraud loss in the UK for 2004-2005+ show that the only type of
fraud to increase this past year was so called ‘CARD-NOT-PRESENT’ crime typical
of mail order or online transactions. Here we propose a method of protecting these
‡ www.magiqtech.com
§ www.idquantique.com
‖ www.smartquantum.com
¶ www.secoqc.net
+ www.apacs.org.uk
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transactions using the shared secret stored in a personal handheld transmitter which is
regularly topped up by secure key exchange with a stationary receiver unit. The Alice
module would be incorporated within a small device such as a mobile phone, or PDA,
and the Bob module within a large fixed device such as a bank ATM, known as the
“Quantum ATM”.
A typical usage scenario would be for a customer to register for this service in her
bank. Once the customer is verified as a legitimate account holder, she is given a SIM
card (or an equivalent storage device) containing an initial unique secret bit string which
she shares with a central secure server that all ATMs have access to. This One-Time-
Pad (OTP) is then used to authenticate and encrypt future transactions, whether it be
withdrawing cash from an ATM or buying products online. As each security operation
requires the consumption of some of the shared secret, the user would periodically revisit
the “Quantum ATM” and ‘top up’ both their copy and the Bank’s copy of the shared
secret.
2. The System
The system described here is based on the BB84 protocol with a slight variation
from the usual free space experimental implementation. Figure 2 shows a common
optical arrangement in a receiver unit where the random basis selection and polarization
measurement is made. For example, a vertically polarized photon, emitted from Alice is
directed through the 50:50 beamsplitter BS, making the basis selection. If it is reflected,
the photon is to be measured in the rectilinear basis and the polarizing beamsplitter
PBS1 directs the photon to a detector according to its polarization. Thus D1 receives
a click. If the photon is transmitted at BS, the diagonal basis is chosen and the
photon passes through the λ/2 plate and then PBS2 where, in the case of a vertically
polarized photon, either D3 or D4 might click with equal probability. This result would
be discarded later in the sifting process as Bob measured the photon in the wrong basis.
Therefore, in general, the BB84 implementation has a 50% protocol efficiency as half
the photons will be measured in the wrong basis. We use a different optical arrangement
which acts to reduce the size of the module as well as the cost. It involves the use of a
holographic diffraction grating to produce a 2x2 matrix of beam paths (figure 2). The
grating therefore makes the random basis selection by sending an incident photon in
one of four directions. In order to make the polarization measurements in accordance
with the BB84 protocol, dichroic sheet polarizer was placed in front of each detector in
one of the four polarization orientations. Note that in this arrangement, the protocol
efficiency has dropped to 25% since the photon is directed randomly in one of four
ways. This trade-off in efficiency vs. cost was deemed acceptable since there are far
fewer transmission losses in a short range system.
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Figure 2. On the left, a common implementation of the BB84 protocol using a
beamsplitter cube (BS), a half-wave plate (λ/2) and two polarizing beamsplitter
cubes (PBS1 and PBS2). The diagram on the right shows a compact system using a
diffraction grating and dichroic sheet polarizer over each detector.
2.1. The Alice Module
In its experimental form, the Alice module uses off-the-shelf IC components in a driver
circuit which produces sub-5ns pulses. The driver pulses are then ANDed with the
output from a digital input/output card (NuDAQ, Adlink PCI-7300A) and passed to
one of four AlInGaP, miniature, red-orange LEDs (Agilent, HLMA-QH00), see figure 3.
The output from the NuDAQ card is regulated by an external oven-stabilized clock
(C-MAC Frequency Products, CFPO-6) and passes a random bit string, generated by
a quantum random number generator (QRNG), (IDQuantique, Quantis) to the Alice
module, recording which LED fires. Due to the limitations of the i/o card, the driver
pulses are produced at a repetition rate of 5MHz. The four LEDs were intensity balanced
by adjusting the current to each diode and timing jitter measurements were carried out
for each channel showing, on average, pulses of 2.4ns duration. Figure 3 also shows the
resulting time interval histogram of one channel.
The LEDs are attached to a holder, see figure 4, with dichroic sheet polarizer,
orientated in each of the four polarization states, 0◦ , 45◦ , 90◦ and 135◦ , placed over each
output. To combine the beam paths, the same four way diffraction grating arrangement
was used. The holder serves to direct the polarized light towards the grating as well as
restrict the viewing angle of the diodes. A pinhole was placed after the grating together
with a 50mm focal length lens to collimate the beam. A 632.8±3nm filter was included
to limit the bandwidth.
Alice and Bob communicate via the internet. This is assumed to be a public channel.
In the intended use model, this will be replaced by an IrDA infra red communication
channel.
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Figure 3. The sub-5ns driver pulse is ANDed with the signal from the digital I/O
card (NuDAQ) that determines which LED will fire. The time interval histogram gives
a measure of the optical pulse width of one LED from the Alice module.
Figure 4. Front and side view of the holder designed to house the LEDs. The front
view shows the dichroic sheet polarizer placed over each LED output.
2.2. The Bob Module
In its experimental form, the Bob module contains four passively quenched silicon
avalanche photodiodes (Perkin Elmer, C30902S) which are cooled down to -10◦C and
maintained by a temperature controlling circuit. Since these detectors operate at a
relatively high voltage, a high voltage DC-DC converter (EMCO, Q03-5) was included
so that the Bob module can run off a low voltage supply. A simple discriminator circuit
takes the output from the detectors and converts it to a readable positive pulse. Time
of arrival information is recorded by a time interval analyser card (TIA, GuideTech,
GT653).
In a similar setup to the Alice module, the dichroic sheet polarizer was placed in
front of each detector orientated in the four polarization directions with the diffraction
grating in place, as shown in figure 2. In addition to this arrangement, a 632.8 ± 3nm
filter was included to reduce the background count and a 50mm focal length lens to
collect the beam from Alice and focus it down onto the detectors.
The bit error rate (BER) for each channel was estimated from data taken during key
exchange (see section 3).
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BER =
Nwrong
Ntotal
(1)
where Nwrong is the number of bits in error and Ntotal is the number of bits received in
total.
This gives a measure of the likelihood of Bob receiving a 0 when a 1 was sent from
Alice. All but one of the BER values in table 1 are sufficiently low showing that optical
imperfections from the equipment will contribute little to the error in the sifted key.
Unfortunately, the over-sensitivity of one detector in the Bob module is responsible for
the greater BER in the 135◦ channel. Whilst this problem does increase the overall
base error rate of the system and ultimately bias Bob’s data opening it up to possible
attacks [17], this was deemed acceptable with the current set of equipment providing
proof-of-principle results. An updated version of the receiver module is in development
with balanced detectors and a more efficient cooling system to lower the dark count
rates.
Table 1. Table showing the BER values at 0◦ , 45◦ , 90◦ and 135◦ as percentages
calculated from equation 1.
Channel Bit Error Rate (%)
0◦ 1.32
45◦ 2.54
90◦ 2.20
135◦ 4.75
2.3. Loss Tolerance of a Daylight System
Since the module will have to be able to operate in daylight conditions, the background
error rate [12] is the most important consideration in designing the receiver unit. It will
be the limiting factor of the entire system.
The signal count for this system is defined as
S =
RMTη
4
(2)
where R is the pulse repetition rate, M is the average number of photons per pulse,
T is the lumped transmission (including geometric loss) and η is the detection system
efficiency. The protocol effectively splits the signal into four on the detectors leading to
a factor of 4 reduction in signal bit rate after sifting the key. The background rate is
given by
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Pb = Bt (3)
where B is the background count rate per detector and t is the time synchronization
gate. Half these background counts induce an error and half are thrown away in the
protocol but contributions arise from all four detectors.
Using equations (2) and (3), the background error rate is thus given as
E = Ebase +
Pb
S
(4)
A base error rate of Ebase = 0.027 (derived from an average of the values in table 1) is
expected thus
E = 0.027 +
4Bt
MTη
(5)
Error correction schemes will operate efficiently with an error rate of E < 0.08, therefore
the maximum acceptable background count rate per detector is given as
B <
MTη
75.5t
(6)
In considering the system presented here, estimates can be made for the following values:
• M ∼ 0.3, an accepted value for guaranteed security of low loss systems, using the
optimal choice for the expected photon number taken from [18].
• T ∼ 1 since the source can be imaged onto the receiver and the system is short
range and thus atmospheric loss is negligible.
• η ∼ 0.045 taking into account the quantum efficiency of the detectors and the
presence of the narrowband filter and polarizers.
• t = 5ns gate synchronization time.
Thus the maximum background count rate per detector can be given as roughly
B ≤ 36000 Counts/sec
The current version of the Bob module can operate in shaded areas but not in full
direct sunlight. Of course higher error rates are in part due to a relatively wide time
synchronization gate. This is due to the limitation of using LEDs to produce short
pulses. The timing window can be shortened further but then the bit rate is reduced,
as is shown in section 4, figure 9. An updated version is under development whereby a
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restriction in the field of view and greater spectral filtering will be introduced. Shared se-
cret generation has been carried out at background light levels of up to 26000 counts/sec
and the results are shown in section 3.
In order to ascertain how well the hardware compared to equation 5, a random data
string was sent from Alice to Bob and the percentage of errors at varying backgrounds
was calculated. Figure 5 shows this relationship as well as the predicted error rate for
each background level. The dashed red lines are essentially an upper and lower bound to
the predicted error rate since the channels within the Bob module have slight differences
in efficiency. As is shown, the data points all fit well within these bounds. Again, an
updated version of the Bob module is expected to increase the value of η to about 0.08
per detector and thus raise the background level at which the system can operate to
over 60000 counts per second. Also note that our two channel measurement system
(see section 3.1) effectively doubles the background rate per detector and a four channel
measurement system will further improve our resilience to background light.
Figure 5. Graph showing the relationship between the estimated error rate and
the background counts per second The red line is the predicted error rate calculated
from equation 5. Our current Bob module has detectors of slightly varying detection
efficiency. The dashed lines indicate the predicted error rate with η at 0.045 and 0.055.
3. Experimental Setup
The experimental setup for quantum key distribution is shown in figure 6. As mentioned
in section 2.1, a file containing a random bit string generated from the QRNG is supplied
to the NuDAQ which in turn controls the Alice module at a repetition rate of 5MHz.
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The quantum transmission is received by the Bob module which passes the four channel
outputs to the TIA card.
Figure 6. Schematic showing the experimental setup for demonstrating key exchange.
3.1. Software
The key requirements from the software is that it should be fast establishing a key
within seconds. This should work with minimal interactivity between Alice and Bob
and with low processing power at Alice. The synchronization (of both clock and start
time) and error correction software have been developed with these constraints in mind.
3.1.1. Synchronization In this system, the data is recorded first during the quantum
transmission and processed afterwards in a few seconds. The start of the transmission
is determined approximately by searching for a jump in the frequency of time tags as
Bob starts measuring before Alice begins her transmission. Alice transmits sub-5ns
pulses every 200ns, therefore a time synchronization gate of 5ns reduces the probability
of registering a background event within the gate by a factor of 40. The clock at
Bob is thus synchronised with the clock at Alice by searching for time tags that sit
at separations of 200ns and adjusting the time separation slightly every ∼ 100ms to
compensate for clock drift. The advantage of this setup is that no timing reference signal
is needed. To determine the exact start time of the data Bob reveals a random subset
of his measured bit values and the basis he used to Alice. Alice then finds the data
start by performing a sparse correlation against her stored data. This random subset
can also be reused to estimate the error rate.
Since the GT653 is a two-input card, we combine two channels into one input
by delaying one channel by 40ns, see figure 7. In doing this, the background count
rate is effectively doubled. This is not currently a problem since we can determine the
true signal to noise ratio from the data and calculate error rates and thus secret bit
yields against this background. However, the background count rates shown are not
per detector but per channel and so using the TIA card in this manner does become
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a limiting factor when operating at higher background light levels as we are effectively
making the situation worse. Improvements to this setup are discussed in section 4.
Figure 7. Two histograms showing the results of running the synchronization routine
on the data from the TIA card. The card has only two input channels so two channels
from Bob are coupled onto the other two with a fixed delay of 40ns accounting for
the two peaks shown. The right hand graph shows how the noise increases when the
experiment is run in higher background light levels.
3.1.2. Error correction Most quantum cryptography systems use the Cascade [3]
algorithm since it operates close to the theoretical Shannon limit. It is highly interactive
involving many separate two-way communication steps. Any latency in the classical
channel dramatically slows the process. Thus another method of error correction has
been adapted for this system. We have chosen a version of the Low Density Parity
Check (LDPC) [19] algorithm as the protocol has very little interactive communication.
In fact, Alice merely needs to transmit an error correction syndrome to Bob. One
drawback is that LDPC requires a pessimistic lower bound estimate of the error rate.
The synchronization protocol already provides us with an error estimate. Information
revealed during the error correction process is removed by a privacy amplification
process [7] in which key length is reduced.
It should be noted that our implementation of error correction requires that Alice
and Bob both generate the same random factor graph. Once Alice and Bob know the
number of message bits they are error correcting over, and the measured error rate, they
seed a pseudo random number generator from their OTP and use this to generate an
appropriate factor graph. Eve, the eavesdropper, is assumed not to know which of the
2256, say, different factor graphs Alice and Bob are using.
3.2. Experimental Results
Using the experimental setup described in section 3, we carried out a series of key
exchange runs at varying background light levels. From the data we extracted an
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error rate using the methods described above. The error corrected keys were then
passed through the privacy amplification process to remove all possible information
leaked to a theoretical eavesdropper. This effectively reduces the length of the key but
ensures absolute secrecy. To estimate the key length reduction, we use the Lutkenhaus
bound [20] and details are presented in the appendix. The resulting number of bits
divided by the collection time thus gives us an equivalent secret bit rate as a function
of background counts which we show in figure 8. We are able to establish just over
4000 secret bits per second at low background with over 500 secret bits at count rates
exceeding 25000 counts/sec. We note here that we have maintained a very pessimistic
view of the eavesdropper’s capabilities and there may be the possibility of increasing
the number of secret bits without incurring too strong a security penalty. Our near
term target will be to improve the system to the point where 10000 secret bits can
be generated even with backgrounds of order 30000 per second. We can immediately
do this if we double the repetition rate to 10MHz, improve the Bob module detection
efficiency to 8% and increase the protocol efficiency from 25% to 50%. We discuss this
further in the following section.
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Figure 8. Graph showing the relationship between the secret bit rate and the
background counts per second.
4. The Future
The initial experimental setup has shown that off-the-shelf components can be used to
carry out quantum key distribution. We are currently working to produce stand-alone
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modules for the transmitter and receiver. An inexpensive Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) will be used to replace much of what has been achieved by software
on Alice’s computer as well as replace the driver circuit shown in section 2.1. The
transmission rate of this system will be increased to 10MHz. We will interface the
FPGA Alice module with a PDA (Hewlett-Packard, iPAQ hx4700 series) via serial cable
and are developing the software to run on the PDA which will incorporate the IrDA
or BlueTooth facilities as the QKD public channel. We are also working on an FPGA
solution to the time interval analyser on the receiver side. A four channel TIA module
with an estimated resolution of 300ps is under development.
Improvements to the software both in speed and efficiency are under way. There
are plans to dynamically evaluate Bob’s data using various time synchronization gate
widths depending on the level of background counts. In this way we will still be able to
obtain secret bits at higher background levels. It is important that we do not waste the
OTP stack by authentication protocols whilst attempting to carry out key exchange in
very bright conditions. Once the OTP is depleted from too many unsuccessful attempts
to extend the key, the user would have to revisit the bank to obtain a new OTP. Figure 9
illustrates how a secret bit rate can be achieved at higher background count rates by
evaluating Bob’s data with narrower gate widths.
On the hardware side, we plan to improve the Bob receiver module. Initially we will
start by using an improved grating and polarizers to increase the efficiency to around
8%. However, as the receiver module can be a static medium cost device, it may prove
better to return to a classical beamsplitter based design with protocol efficiency of 50%.
Eventually the Alice module must be able to be brought to the Bob module and fully
automatically aligned. Initially this may be simply done using a fixed alignment cradle
or docking station. However, we are also considering active methods for aligning a
hand-held Alice module to a stationary Bob module.
5. Conclusion
We have built a low cost free-space quantum cryptography system using off-the-shelf
components that is able to generate and renew shared secrets on demand over a short
range of up to a metre in shaded daylight conditions. The transmitter unit is compact
and we are aiming eventually to incorporate it in a hand held device such as a smart card
or mobile phone. A full software system has been developed to handle synchronization,
error estimation and correction and privacy amplification. We have tested the system in
a range of background levels up to that equivalent to shaded daylight conditions. The
system is designed to work in short-range consumer applications and we have described
a use scenario where the consumer can regularly ‘top up’ a store of secrets for use
in a variety of one-time-pad and authentication protocols. We have described various
improvements to the system that will increase our background light tolerance and bit
rates while reducing cost and complexity. Currently, our system can generate around
4000 bits of secret keys from a one second interaction between transmitter and receiver
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Figure 9. Graph showing the relationship between the secret bit rate and the
background counts per second using 3,5 and 7ns time synchronization gate widths.
Since the system must be able to operate in daylight conditions there could be a
procedure whereby Bob samples the background count before synchronization and
correlation procedures and chooses which gate width to use.
in low light conditions. In the next generation device we expect to be able to operate
at 10000 secret bits per second up to full daylight conditions.
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Appendix
The number of sifted key bits received in a transmission of duration t is given by
nrec = St (A.1)
In using the LDPC coding scheme, the error correction efficiency E is calculated
using
E = 1− nsyn/nrec (A.2)
where nsyn is the number of syndromes needed. Maintaining a pessimistic view
of an eavesdropper’s capabilities, we discard all syndrome bits. In considering a pulse
splitting attack with zero loss transmission technology [20], the eavesdropper takes all
the pulses at the output of Alice an blocks all single photon pulses. Multi-photon pulses
are split and sent on through a loss free channel to Bob. The split off photons are stored
until the bases are revealed thus making all received pulses insecure. If we assume a
Poisson distribution for the faint pulse photon number probability then
P (n) =
Mne−M
n!
(A.3)
and
P (n ≥ 2) = 1− e−M −Me−M (A.4)
Secret bits are only gained when the received photon rate nrec is greater than the
multi-photon rate. We then calculate the fraction of received bits that are guaranteed
to be secure as
b = 1−
(1− e−M −Me−M )
(1− e−M)T
(A.5)
where T is the efficiency of the free space channel.
We cannot use these bits either in the key or to estimate the error rate. Hence us-
ing Lutkenhaus’ formulae, the secret bit rate becomes
nfin = (nrec − nerr)b
(
E − log2
(
1 + 4
ǫ
b
− 4
(ǫ
b
)2))
− ns (A.6)
where nerr is the number of bits used to estimate the error, ǫ is the estimated error rate
and ns is a safety margin in this case set to 100 bits.
Calculating nfin for each data point, figure 8 shows how the secret bit rate varies with
background count.
